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PERPETUITIES: THE WAIT-AND-SEE
DISASTER-A BRIEF REPLY TO
PROFESSOR MAUDSLEY, WITH A
FEW ASIDES TO PROFESSORS
LEACH, SIMES, WADE,
DR. MORRIS, ET AL.*
Samuel M. Fetterst
This Article is dedicated to the memory of
Lewis M. Simes (1889-1974).
The perpetuities reform movement has been in progress for
over twenty years now. Wait-and-see, in its variety of forms, has
generated more debate than most other proposals intended as
cures for the ills (both real and imagined) of the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities. An important by-product of the debate has
been an attempt to identify fundamental policy reasons for the
Rule. It is not inappropriate, therefore, to review the assumptions,
speculations, rationalizations, and conclusions which have been
advanced in the progress of the debate before proceeding to the
merits of Professor Maudsley's specific proposal.
But even before that, I think it only fair to warn the reader, as
Maudsley has done, that my orientation is against wait-and-see in
any of its forms so that those who entertain no doubts as to the
wisdom of the wait-and-see solution might be 'spared reading
beyond these few words of introduction. My task, it seems, is even
more difficult than that of Professor Maudsley. I find myself in
agreement with much of his formulation; yet, Maudsley's rational-
ization of the English statutory variation of wait-and-see appears to
accept and to build upon an erroneous perception of the policy
behind the Rule. Hence, this reply.
* W. Barton Leach, late Story Professor of Law, Harvard University; Lewis M. Simes,
late Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan and Hastings College of Law; H. W.
R. Wade, Professor of Law, Oxford University; Dr. John H. C. Morris, Magdalen College,
Oxford University.
t Professor of Law, Syracuse University. LL.B. 1954, De Paul University; LL.M. 1957,
University of Illinois; Visiting Professor of Law, Spring term 1975, University of South
Carolina. The author wishes to thank Stanley W. Widger, Jr., Editor-in-Chief, and Leslie D.
Locke, Managing Editor, both of the Cornell Law Review, for the diligent and highly
professional manner in which they discharged their editorial responsibilities.
REPLY TO PROFESSOR MAUDSLEY
I
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS I
The two opposing wait-and-see protagonists, the late Professor
W. Barton Leach-for, and the late Professor Lewis M. Simes
-against, seemed to agree that the Rule Against Perpetuities no
longer serves its principal historical purpose (as they saw it) of
securing alienability of land for the purpose of productivity-and,
as a corollary, it is not required to prevent affected land from
stagnation caused by the fetters of dead-hand control. As to the
unimportance of the Rule in reference to the alienability of specific
parcels of land affected with future interests, whether vested or
contingent, Simes' observations and conclusions were not chal-
lenged either by Leach and his wait-and-see followers or by mem-
bers of the opposition camp. Surprisingly, however, both advocates
and opponents generally agreed with Simes' view as to the primary
purpose for the Rule Against Perpetuities. In the second edition of
his comprehensive treatise on the law of future interests,' Simes
distilled into two short paragraphs his conclusions as to the "com-
pelling reasons for [retention of] the rule against perpetuities."
"First," he stated, "it strikes a fair balance between the satisfaction
of the wishes of members of the present generation to tie up their
property and those of future generations to do the same. The
desire of property owners to convey or devise what they have by
the use of trusts and future interests is widespread, and the law
gives some scope to that almost universal want. But if it were
permitted without limit, then members of future generations
would receive this property already tied up with future interests
and trusts, and could not give effect to their desires for the
disposition of the property. Thus," concluded Simes, "the law
strikes a balance between [the] desires of the present generation
and . . . future generations.
2
L SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited
as Sim.S & SMiTH].
2 Id. § 1117, at 13. Professor Simes' previous statement along this line of thought,
although quite similar to his statement quoted above, does not emphasize the continued
tying up of property by succeeding generations: "First, the Rule against Perpetuities strikes a
fair balance between the desires of members of the present generation, and similar desires
of succeeding generations, to do what they wish with the property they enjoy." L. SIMES,
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 58 (1955).
Both statements suggest that the Rule Against Perpetuities restricts dead-hand control
by freeing the property from the future interests of their creator. If the Rule required
vesting in possession rather than vesting in interest within the perpetuities period, both of
Simes' statements would be accurate. As it is, both statements in regard to striking a fair
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Professor Leach's most recent statement of the rationale for
the Rule appeared in The Rule Against Perpetuities.3 I think it
significant that Leach joined with one of the leading British per-
petuities scholars in stating his conclusions as to the present
justification for the continued existence of the Rule. It is even more
significant that the distillation process employed by Morris and
Leach to identify the present rationale for the Rule was to review
reasons advanced by other writers, and then to dismiss those
reasons out of hand. They made particular note4 of Simes' careful
analysis in Public Policy and the Dead Hand,5 and then minimized or
disparaged all but his final conclusion quoted above. 6 "Another
reason for the Rule suggested by Professor Simes," Morris and
Leach stated, "seems to the present authors far more realistic."'7
After quoting Simes, the authors concluded: "It is a natural human
desire to provide for one's family in the foreseeable future. The
difficulty is that if one generation is allowed to create unlimited
future interests in property, succeeding generations will receive the
property in a restricted state and thus be unable to indulge the
same desire. The dilemma is thus precisely what it has been
throughout the history of English law, namely, how to prevent the
power of alienation from being used to its own destruction. In this
balance between present and future generations should be preceded by the words, "tends
to."
Simes offered a second reason: "[O]ther things being equal, society is better off, if
property is controlled by its living memhers than if controlled by the dead. Thus, one policy
back of the rule against perpetuities is to prevent too much dead hand control .... " SIMES &
SMITH § 1117, at 13. No one should argue with this; yet, a rule addressed to remote vesting
only tends to pass the control of wealth to the living. Until it vests in possession it is, for all
practical purposes, still controlled by the dead.
3 J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 13-18 (2d ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as MORRIS & LEACH].
4 Id.
5 L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955).
6 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
Leach used this same technique two years earlier in his classic article, Perpetuities
Legislation: Hail Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960). His cavalier, summary
dismissal of the American Law Institute's attempted identificaton of the Rule's contemporary
social utilty was, in whole, as follows:
The Restatement concedes that "the basis or justification of this assumption [that
social welfare requires the imposition of restrictions upon the fettering of property]
has never been adequately explored and has been seldom discussed." And then, of
course, the Reporter [Professor Richard R. Powell, who just happens to oppose
wait-and-see (see Powell, The Rule Against Perpetuities and -Spendthrift Trusts in New
York, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 688, 693-94 (1971))] and his advisors (all lawyers, no
economists or sociologists) [and two more of Leach's most outspoken wait-and-see
adversaries] go right forward with a "rationale" of the whole law of perpetuities
upon social and economic bases. Adequate exploration is still for the future.
Id. at 1135 (footnote omitted).
7 MORRIS & LEACH 17.
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idea of compromise between two competing policies-freedom of
disposition by one generation and freedom of disposition by suc-
ceeding generations-the Rule against Perpetuities seems to the
present authors to find its best justification."18
I apologize to those readers who have patiently stayed with me
in rereading statements of others for asking them to read yet
another quotation. This one, however, I probably should have
reproduced first: "I must begin with apologies for venturing to talk
in an area where so much has already been written by such notable
scholars." Professor Philip Mechem need not have pro-
fessed such modesty. On the other hand, I feel quite comfortable
in adopting his false modesty as the true state of affairs in refer-
ence to myself. I was an observer rather than a participant in the
reform-movement debate. From that neutral vantage point it ap-
pears to me that if there is no more justification for the Rule than
that which has been advanced by both "reformists" and
"traditionalists," the Rule should be abolished. As with other prop-
erty rules, doctrines, and procedures which no longer bear any
relevance to contemporary society-e.g., the Rule in Shelley's
Case, 10 the Doctrine of Worthier Title," the rule of Destructibility
of Contingent Remainders,12 the rule of Purefoy v. Rogers,13 the
common recovery as recognized in Taltarum's Case,' 4 and all the
SId.
o Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
965 (1959) (footnote omitted).
1 I Co. Rep. 93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1581). For an extensive discussion of the
Rule, see I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 4.40-.52 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 378-80 (1952); SIMES & SMITH §§ 1541-72.
The Rule in Shelley's Case is still in force in only five states: Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Indiana, and North Carolina.
11 The leading American case on the Doctrine of Worthier Title is Doctor v. Hughes,
225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919). Although it probably still is in force in a majority of
jurisdictions (see 3 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 314 (1940)), hostility to the doctrine is
manifest and its continued survival appears dubious. See, e.g., Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361
F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
12 The doctrine survives intact only in the state of Florida. See Blocker v. Blocker, 103
Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931); Fetters, Destructibility of Contingent Remainders, 21 ARK. L. REV.
145 (1967).
11 2 Wins. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (K.B. 1670). The Rule of Purefoy v. Rogers
was stated by Chief Justice Hale as follows: "[F]or where a contingency is limited to depend on an
estate of freehold which is capable of supporting a remainder, it shall never be construed to be an
executory devise, but a contingent remainder only, and not otherwise .... " 2 Wins. Saund. at 388,
85 Eng. Rep. at 1192. The effect of this rule was to perpetuate the Destructibility Rule, even
after gaps and lapses in seizin were allowed to take effect as executory interests under the
Statute of Uses and the Statute of Wills.
14 Y.B. Pasch. 12 Edw. 4, f. 19b (1472). The common recovery was a fictitious lawsuit,
the end result of which was to allow a tenant in fee tail to make himself an owner in fee




rest of our common-law heritage invented by the courts to promote
alienability of land and to limit the pocketing of wealth and
power-so too should we abandon the obsolete Rule Against Per-
petuities. More than a decade ago, in the heyday of the wait-and-
see debate, Professor Mechem mused--"Why not simply
abandon"15 the Rule? Having posed the truly critical question, his
answer was, appropriate to his wisdom, "I don't know, frankly,
whether I make that proposal seriously or not."'1 6
Professor Jesse Dukeminier, who drafted the "causal relation-
ship to vesting" wait-and-see statute for Kentucky and was the
moving force in its eventual enactment, reported that the only
substantive objection to the Act voiced on the floor of the Kentucky
Senate was that wait-and-see would prove inconvenient. 17
Dukeminier reported that one senator's "understandable com-
plaint" was that "this is the most complex subject ever brought up
in the legislature, and I'm not going to vote for something I don't
understand." 8 It would be interesting to imagine the colloquy that
might have ensued had the senator asked the next logical question
which, if adequately answered, might have permitted him to vote
for the Act even if he remained somewhat confused as to its de-
tails:
SENATOR: Professor Dukeminier, what is the purpose of
the Rule, and to what extent does your proposed Act better
serve that purpose?
DUKEMINIER: The consensus among those who are rec-
ognized today as the leading perpetuities scholars is that the
rule "strikes a fair balance between the satisfaction of the
wishes of members of the present generation to tie up their
property and those of future generations to do the same;"1 9
or, put another way, "if one generation is allowed to create
unlimited future interests in property, succeeding generations
will receive the property in a restricted state and thus be
unable to indulge the same desire. 2 °
SENATOR: I take it that when you refer to tying up prop-
erty and the creation of future interests, Professor, you mean
15 Mechem, supra note 9, at 968.
16 Id.
17 Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L. REv. 3, 57
(1960); J. DUKEMINIER, PERPETUITIEs LAW IN ACTION: KENTUCKY CASE LAW AND THE 1960
REFoRM ACT 73 (1962) (book reprints article in revised form).
18 Id.
19 See note 2 supra.
20 See MORRIS & LEACH 17.
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in reference to private family trusts rather than specific parcels
of land?
DUKEMINIER: Yes, sir. The practice of creating legal life
estates and remainders in land is uncommon today. And even
then, there generally are judicial methods for freeing the
affected lands from such divided ownership. 21
SENATOR: Now, Professor Dukeminier, would you con-
sider it grossly unfair if I, a lawmaker, yet a layman, were to
characterize the "best justification" for the Rule today some-
what as follows?: That it is concerned with trust beneficiaries
unfairly and capriciously being denied the same right which
their ancestor, who built the original fortune, had in exercising
dead-hand control. And further, we are not talking about the
deprivations of those unfortunate trust beneficiaries who were
the immediate objects of the settlor's bounty and whom he
knew or might have known personally, but of those remote
beneficiaries whose only memory of him, if any, is vicarious,
having been communicated to them through the family Bible,
picture album, or the repetition of ancestral folklore. If it is
this class of persons we are concerned about, and if the Rule
does not contribute to the common good by striking a reason-
able balance between the free right of testation and the pro-
longed pocketing of wealth, then it certainly does not deserve
the amount of scholarly, legislative, and judicial time it has
consumed and continues to consume. I'm sorry, Professor, to
have pejoratively framed my question and apologize further
for then answering my own question. But if, as Morris and
Leach contend, the Rule is designed "to prevent the power of
alienation from being used to its own destruction,"22 then if
the rich foolishly so use it, so be it. The rich and the super-rich
need no special laws to protect them from their own folly so
long as it does not hurt the rest of society. So, let them attempt
to tie up their property in perpetuity and let their fortunes be
dissipated by each successive remainderman selling out for a
pittance to escape his ancestor's dead-hand control. 3
21 For a thorough review of the subject of freeing land from future interests in England
and in the United States, see L. SImES, supra note 2, at 32-54.
' MORRIS & LEACH 17.
23 In this country, there appears to be no established, conventional, commercial market
for the purchase and sale of future interests. A rare glimpse of the actual market for such
transactions was afforded by the protracted litigation in Matter of Vought's Estate, 57 Misc.
2d 396, 293 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co., 1967), affid, 30 App. Div. 2d 805, 292 N.Y.S.2d
991 (mem., 1st Dep't 1968), affd, 25 N.Y.2d 163, 250 N.E.2d 343, 303 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1969).
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While I still have the floor, I would like to return to the
second part of my very first question to you, Professor. And
that is, "to what extent does your proposed Act better serve
the purpose of the Rule," assuming, for the time being, that
the balance which it seeks to strike is one which should
concern this legislative body? More specifically, have condi-
tions so changed since Gray first articulated the Rule2 4 that it
no longer strikes this proper balance? If so, which way is it
leaning?
DUKEMINIER: Well, Senator, the proposed Act does not
address that issue. Under the common-law Rule, a person who
wants to tie up his estate and has a competent attorney may
create a spendthrift trust which might last for well over a
See 76 Misc. 2d 755, 351 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co., 1973). In this case, the trust
corpus beneficiary, whose remainder interest was indefeasibly vested, made assiguments
which purported to transfer to the assignees his entire interest in the trust corpus. Within a
two-year period, some four years prior to his death, the trust remainderman executed four
instruments purporting to be bills of sale and assignments of his remainder interest. The
first three of these, in stated dollar amounts, totaled $1,100,000.00. The fourth and final
assignment purported to quitclaim whatever might remain of his interest in trust principal.
At the time of the assignments, the market value of the remainderman's interest in trust
principal was $90,000.00. Six years later, when the life tenant died, the value of the
remainderman's interest was $1,857,876.20. The court found that, at most, a total sum of
$54,000.00 was paid for the assignments and that the assignor probably received $29,500.00
with $24,500.00 paid directly to his creditors and $2,000.00 paid for attorney's fees in these
transactions.
It eventually turned out that the future interests merchants came up empty
handed. They had, no doubt, speculated that the spendthrift clause in reference to
Chance's interest in trust principal was invalid. To their great dismay, the Court of Appeals
held otherwise. Furthermore, the surrogate court denied them relief in their attempt to
enforce their claim against Chance's estate. All of which prompted Craig B. Smith, a senior
law student at Syracuse University, to capture the essence of the whole matter in appropriate
doggerel:
There once was a spendthrift aptly named Chance.
Who assigned his remainder well in advance.
His assignees chortled on their way to probate,
Having cheaply acquired young Chance's estate.
But an attorney of wit had dexterously contrived,
And Chance's father's great wealth so cleverly devised,
That the assignees learned to their sorrowful rue,
Young Chance had had his cake and eaten it too.
For an excellent discussion of practical alienability of future interests-what the trust
beneficiary experiences when he attempts to exercise his legal right to alienate his future
interest, see Bullock v. Becker, 52 Misc. 2d 698, 276 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1965), affid, 27
App. Div. 2d 647, 277 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st Dep't 1966), appeal denied, 19 N.Y.2d 581, 226
N.E.2d 708, 279 N.Y.S,2d 1027 (1967).
In England, there has been for many years an established auction market for future
interests. Kessler, Future Inheritances Auctioned at Discount for Cash Now; Then the Buyers Sit and
Wait, Wall St. Jour., May 10, 1971, at 1, col.4 (reprinted in 0. BROWDER, JR., L. WAGGONER
& R. WELLMAN, FAMILY PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS 66 (2d ed. 1973)).
24 J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1st ed. 1886).
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century. On the other hand, the Rule is in disrepute because it
operates as a trap for the unwary, causing perfectly reasonable
dispositions to fail. This Act should save reasonable disposi-
tions from aberrational applications of the common-law Rule.
SENATOR: Thank you, Professor Dukeminier. I may be
wrong, but I think you have just stated another reason for
total abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities. In short, it
does not prevent unreasonable and anti-social dispositions, but
may strike down perfectly reasonable ones. Why should we
attempt to salvage such a singularly worthless rule? Let's just
rid ourselves of it.
Without attempting, at this point, to catalogue public, .as dis-
tinguished from private, policy reasons for the Rule Against Per-
petuities in contemporary society, let us assume "that social welfare
requires the imposition of restrictions upon the fettering of
property" 25 and upon the pocketing of wealth. This basic assump-
tion is not rejected entirely by the "reformers" but is substantially
minimized. Graduated income, estate, and inheritance taxes, it is
argued, more effectively curb man's dynastic instincts,26 if indeed
twentieth century man still retains such primitive drives.27 The
25 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY Part I, at 2123 (1944).
21 "Graduated estate and income taxes have largely eliminated any threat to the public
welfare from family dynasties built either on great landed estates or on great capital wealth."
Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721, 727
(1952). "It would seem, however, that succession and estate tax laws can more effectively
cope with the problem, and, indeed, are now doing so." SIMES & SMITH § 1117, at 12-13.
Professor Leach has indicated that the Rule is intended to remove the "threat to the
public welfare from family dynasties built either on great landed estates or on great
capital wealth." But, as he points out, that threat is rather effectively removed by
our income and estate taxes. I am disposed to agree with him. Indeed, I feel that
undue concentration of wealth is an, evil which can best be combatted by tax
legislation, rather than by perpetuities rules.
L. SIMNs, supra note 2, at 56-57 (footnote omitted).
27 The family-dynasty mentality flourished in the eighteenth century and reached a
fine fruition in the will of Peter Thellusson .... The Stately Homes of England
reified the ambitions of the great English families in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. At that time the Rule Against Perpetuities still served a useful
purpose in countering the urge to family aggrandizement. But the taxation follow-
ing two world wars has put an end to the era of the Stately Homes.
.. It does no harm to continue the Rule as a restraint on the whims of an
occasional refugee from the nineteenth century ....
Leach, supra note 26, at 726-27.
First, I must point out that the long trust question is not at issue in discussion
of these [wait-and-see] statutes. The reason is this (and I have said it time and again
and it has never been answered): In all cases that have arisen in this century where the
gift has failed under the Rule, the instrument could have been so drafted as to be
unchallengeable under the strictest perpetuities doctrine unaided by legislation. Furthermore,
I and my reform colleagues, and all the anti-reformists too, would have so drafted
the instrument if they had been advising the donor. Thus, the type of legislation I
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Rule, so states Leach, is an important adjunct of our estate and
inheritance tax system, and prevents the intervals at which the
wealth of the community goes through the tax wringer from being
too long.28
II
Is THE COMMON-LAW PERPETUITIES PERIOD Too LONG?
To determine whether the common-law perpetuities period is
too long, just right, or too short, it is necessary to understand how
to ascertain common-law measuring lives. Anyone who ever has
come into contact with the Rule will, no doubt, agree with Profes-
sor Simes that the perennial question of all students when first
introduced to the Rule is: "How do you determine who is the life in
being?"2 9 or, put another way, "Who are the measuring lives?" The
answer to that question, of course, is important in understanding
the Rule and in applying it to the almost limitless variety of
dispositive provisions incorporated in family property settlements.
But it also is critically significant in evaluating the reform legisla-
tion.
Professor Maudsley states: "The measuring lives at common
law are those persons within 21 years of whose death the interest
must vest, if it vests at all; that is to say, the lives which validate the
gift."30 Professor David Allan agrees 1-and so do I. Prior to the
preparation of this Article, I must confess that I thought there was
no disagreement at least on that issue. And I must confess further
that I read the English and Commonwealth texts and law review
articles, and especially the writings of Dr. Morris and Professor
advocate will not extend the period of the Rule; it will simply give to the donor who
happens to choose a nonspecialist as his counsel the same advantage as if he had
gone to an experienced specialist.
Leach, supra note 6, at 1134. See note 101 and accompanying text infra.
Is there any tendency among the wealthy to produce trusts which exceed the period of
perpetuities? In thirty-five years of practice, largely connected with estate work, I
have never found a testator or settlor who had any wish to exceed the limits of the
Rule in its most severe application.
Leach, supra note 6, at 1140. See notes 97-100 and accompanying text infra.
28 Leach, supra note 6, at 1141.
29 L. SiMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 265 (Handbook 2d ed. 1966).
30 Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming the Common-Law Rule-How to Wait and See, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 355, 373 (1975) (emphasis added).
31 Allan, The Rule Against Perpetuities Restated, 6 U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 27, 43-46 (1963).
Allan, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives in Being, 81 L.Q. REV. 106 (1965), is devoted entirely to
responding to Morris' and Wade's criticism of Allan's identification of common-law measur-
ing lives. See Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REv. 486, 499-501 (1964).
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Wade, without appreciating that their description of common-law
measuring lives included some lives which did not necessarily
validate the interest. I was, therefore, surprised when I read
Professor Maudsley's statement that some of the English per-
petuities scholars included some nonvalidating lives as common-law
measuring lives. A more careful reading of their writings con-
vinced me that Maudsley was correct in asserting that there was,
indeed, disagreement even as to measuring lives at common law.32
as The truth is, we submit, that there is a perfectly clear distinction between
lives which restrict the period for vesting and lives which do not restrict it; that this
distinction is inherent in the Rule against Perpetuities at common law; and that it
enables the appropriate lives in being to be identified, whether the gift succeeds or
fails. To argue that the common law rule cannot identify lives in being which do not save the
gift at common law is to confuse the law as to the length of the available perpetuity period with
the question whether the gift is bound to vest (or, under the new law, does in fact vest) within
that period. Accordingly the shift to "wait and see" should raise no new problems as
to lives in being.
Morris & Wade, supra note 31, at 501 (emphasis added).
It is interesting to compare the corresponding "Lives in Being" sections of W. LEACH &
0. TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 24.13 (1957) [hereinafter cited as LEACH &
TUDOR] (Leach & Tudor, The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 24.13 (A. Casner ed. 1952)) and MORRIS & LEACH 60. The text of these two
corresponding sections is almost identical. Understandably, there are fewer citations from
this country in the British publication and an expanded number of American citations in the
American publication. But the illustrative cases which identify common-law measuring lives
are most interesting if (1) you believed, as did I, that there was no difference between
England and the United States in the structure of the common-law Rule; and (2) you
realized-as everyone does-that the co-author of both books was the same W. Barton
Leach, whose campaign to sell wait-and-see was not confined to this country.
LEACH & TUDOR § 24.13:
Case 14. S transfers stock and bonds to a trustee in trust to pay the same "to
such of my grandchildren as shall reach the age of twenty-one." This gift is bad
under the Rule .... In this instance S's children cannot be taken as the lives in
being, for more children can be born to him between the creation of this trust and
the time of his death.
(My comment: S's children cannot be taken as the lives in being or measuring lives because
they do not necessarily validate the gift to grandchildren.)
MORRIS & LEACH 62:
Illustration 10. T bequeaths property on trust for such of the grandchildren of
A as shall attain twenty-five. If A is alive when T dies, A and A alone is the
measuring life; A's children cannot count as measuring lives because he may have
more children after T's death; and the gift is too remote, because a grandchild may
attain twenty-five more than twenty-one years after A's death. If A is dead when T
dies and any of his children are alive, those children are by implication the
measuring lives (though not mentioned in the will); but at common law the gift to
the grandchildren is still too remote, because a grandchild may attain twenty-five
more than twenty-one years after the death of A's children .... If A and all his
children are dead when T dies, the grandchildren are then measuring lives; and the
gift is valid, because they must attain twenty-five (if at all) within their own lifetimes.
(My comment: I wonder why Professor Leach did not insist upon a dissenting footnote as, on
other occasions, he and his other co-authors were wont to do. See, e.g., Professor Leach's
Dissenting Preface in A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES ON PROPERTY, at xi, xii (1st ed. 1950),
and Mr. Tudor's dissenting footnote in LEACH & TUDOR § 24.29 n.6a (Leach & Tudor, The
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I suspect Morris' and Wade's erroneous identification of common-
law measuring lives is a product of their wait-and-see, causal
relationship to vesting, orientation. 33 There are no judicial deci-
sions on either side of the Atlantic or "Down Under" which
support their analysis. 34
A. Measuring Lives at Common Law
But how do you determine whether the life you have selected
is one which necessarily validates the interest and thus may be
considered a "measuring life" at common law? If you go out
looking for measuring lives, the danger is that you might just find
some one or more persons whose continued life would serve to
validate the interest in question, or whose death would cause the
interest to fail. Once you have found a life in being by this
erroneous process of analysis, you will find it difficult, if not
impossible, to extricate yourself from a line of reasoning which
usually leads to an erroneous conclusion. Rather than look for
measuring lives, first focus upon the interest which is suspected of
violating the Rule, and then ponder whether the event or contin-
gency upon which the interest is to vest, or takers are to be
ascertained, might occur after the death of every person living at
the beginning of the perpetuities period. If the contingency or
ascertainment of takers might occur more than 21 years after the
death of every person alive at the effective date of the creating
instrument, there is a perpetuities violation; otherwise there is not.
Because you will be looking to see whether the interest in
question might vest or fail to vest more than 21 years after the
deaths of all persons living at the inception of the perpetuities
period, it will be necessary that you hypothesize their deaths
immediately thereafter. It soon will become apparent that the
deaths of the vast majority of people living at the inception of the
perpetuities period bear no relationship to the interest under
scrutiny. But, by hypothesizing everyone's death, you will avoid
dwelling upon the continued life of any one person and thus will
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.29 n.6a (A.
Casner ed. 1952)).)
3 See notes 31 & 32 supra.
34 It would, of course, be impossible to find case authority for the analysis that a
measuring life might be one which did not validate the interest. Why should a court trouble
itself with identifying measuring lives only to hold the interest in question nonetheless
invalid? If the measuring life which one party to the litigation advances is irrelevant to the
outcome of that litigation, could that party object to his adversary's advancing an equally
irrelevant life, but one which is totally unrelated to vesting? The fact of irrelevancy is
germane to the litigation. The reason for irrelevancy itself is irrelevant.
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discover whether the suspected interest might vest remotely.
Likewise, by this process you will discover whether it is certain that
the suspected interest must necessarily vest or fail to vest within the
life of any one person (or 21 years after his death) who was alive at
the creation of the interest, in which case, the interest is good. Only
where you discover that an interest must vest or fail to vest during
the life or 21 years after the death of any one person can you say
that that person is a measuring life for purposes of the Rule.
Hence, if you are worried about whether any person might serve as
a "life in being" or as a "measuring life," simply get rid of him and
then examine what effect, if any, his death might have upon the
interest in question. If the ultimate taker could be a descendant of
this person, be sure that you allow him sufficient time to have one
or more children before he is removed from the scene. If you are
still worried that you might have neglected a "measuring life," you
can test your conclusion in any given case by allowing everyone on
earth to have an afterborn child and then die. If it is now certain
that the interest in question must vest or fail to vest within 21 years
of this massive exchange of world population, the interest is good.
If there is still the slightest possibility that it may vest beyond this
period, it is bad.
Several elementary examples should help to demonstrate the
thought process required to solve perpetuities problems. Suppose
that T dies devising certain property "to my youngest male descen-
dant, whenever born, who shall be living 21 years after the death
of the survivor of my children, A, B, and C." T is survived by his
widow, W, three children, A, B, and C, his mother, M, and two
brothers, X and Y. Are all of these persons lives in being? Certainly.
There is nothing in the Rule Against Perpetuities which requires
you to deny the existence of a person who in fact is alive. There
also are plenty of other people around who are "lives in being."
But who are the "measuring lives?" In this example, the answer
appears simple. T has specifically provided for the ascertainment of
his beneficiary to be made 21 years after the death of the longest
liver of three named persons, all of whom were alive at the
inception of the perpetuities period. At this point, you might be
tempted to say that it is easy to identify which lives out of all others
are measuring lives, and that such identification might be made
directly rather than by contemplating the deaths of other persons.
Maybe so-but let's wait and see.
Who would be the lives in being in the above example if T had
provided a 25-year period after the death of the longest liver of A,
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B, and C for determining who might be his youngest descendant
then living? Is it now correct to say that A, B, and C still are
measuring lives because so designated, but the interest is void
because the ultimate taker cannot be ascertained within 21 years of
their deaths? The answer is no. The Rule requires certainty of
vesting within any life in being and 21 years. Here the interest is
void, not because it is incapable of vesting within 21 years of the
deaths of A, B, and C, but because it is not certain to vest within 21
years of anyone's death. T's children could have two or more
children born to them after T's death. The youngest survivor or
more remote descendant of these children might not be deter-
mined within 21 years of the deaths of A, B, C, or anyone else. And
while it is possible that W, M, X, or Y might be alive when this
determination is made, the creating instrument does not require
such determination to be made within 21 years of their deaths or
anyone else's death. It is possible, therefore, that the interest might
vest remotely, and this is enough to run afoul of the Rule.
Two more examples will be considered. Suppose there is a
devise of certain property by T "to my youngest child who shall be
living 21 years after the death of my surviving widow." T dies
survived by his wife, W, two brothers, X and Y, and three children,
A, B, and C. Again it appears to be an easy case for identifying W
as the "measuring life," because she has been specifically so desig-
nated. T's youngest surviving child, if any, necessarily will be
ascertained no later than 21 years after W's death. Now suppose
that T had provided for his property to go "to my youngest child
who shall be living 25 years after the death of my surviving
widow." It is now impossible for the interest to vest within 21 years
of W's death, whether she dies immediately or many years later. If
you have identified W as the measuring life, you must conclude
that the interest is void-and you will be wrong. Let us now
approach the problem correctly. If we suppose that X and Y should
die immediately after T's death, we will see that their lives are
irrelevant to the interest under scrutiny. Their after-born progeny
likewise are irrelevant. W's continued life or death, on the other
hand, is very much involved as T has stated specifically that his
devisee shall be ascertained 25 years after her death. The only
other relevant people alive at T's death were his children, A, B,
and C. Should these children die immediately after T's death, the
gift necessarily would fail because no one could meet the descrip-
tion of T's "youngest child who shall be living 25 years after the
death of my surviving widow." What if Tfs widow lived for another
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75 years? If one or more of T's children survived W, the interest
might vest in one of them 100 years after T's death. Yet the interest
is good because it is certain either to vest or fail within the lives of
T's children's own lives, and they were "lives in being at the
creation of the interest. 3 5
These elementary examples, selected to illustrate the thought
process involved in solving perpetuities problems at common law,
do not represent typical dispositions. More commonly, the trans-
feror establishes a trust to pay the income therefrom to certain
beneficiaries or a class of beneficiaries for life, and at the expiration
of all life estates directs his trustees to deliver trust principal to a
class of corpus beneficiaries composed of his lineal or collateral
kindred or to certain designated charities. Each disposition thus
selects its own measuring lives, and does so in a way which severely
restricts its number-excluding as irrelevant most lives not in-
volved as trust beneficiaries. For example, T dies devising a fund in
trust to pay the income to his widow for life, then to pay the
income to his children for life, and upon the death of each child to
pay that child's share of income to that child's children, and in
default of such issue, to pay the income to T's then-surviving
children, and upon the death of T's last-surviving child, to deliver
trust principal to such of T's grandchildren as shall attain the age
of 21 years, the child or children of any grandchild who dies under
the age of 21 to take his parent's share per stirpes. Here, only T's
children living at his death are measuring lives. T's widow is not a
measuring life even though she is a beneficiary of the trust.
Likewise, living grandchildren or great-grandchildren, if any, are
not measuring lives even though they ultimately might share in the
gift of trust principal.
In this perfectly reasonable disposition, various factors uncon-
nected with validity or invalidity under the Rule will, no doubt,
contribute to a relatively early resolution of dead-hand control.
Trusts to provide for three or more generations (widow, children,
grandchildren, and possibly great-grandchildren) are not usually
created unless the initial trust res is substantial. Unless the creator
of the trust is passing on inherited wealth, he probably has accumu-
lated a good number of years of life while accumulating his wealth.
Putting aside for the moment "fertile octogenarians ' 36 (male and
'- For the past 15 years or so I have explained measuring lives somewhat as described
here. I reduced this explanation to writing some years ago. The explanation in the text, with
minor editorial changes suitable to this Article, appears in S. FET'rms & J. SMiTH, SIMES'
CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS § 15.02 (3d ed. 1971).
36 See Jee v. Audley, I Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
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female), Lolita-type marriages to "unborn widows," 37 and the like,
chances are substantial that T's widow will be well along in years
and that his children will not be infants. Hence, when the survivor
of his children dies, it is likely that all grandchildren then living
already will have attained the age of 21 and the trust will termi-
nate. If, in the development of the Rule, the courts had restricted
the measuring lives to persons beneficially interested in the gift, or,
at least, had excluded extraneous measuring lives, the outer limits
of the common-law perpetuities period occasionally might stretch
beyond society's notion of legitimate dead-hand control. But this
would be exceptional and hence tolerable. We would not (or
should not) overreact to aberrational anomalies to the destruction
of an otherwise functional rule. But, through the use of wholly
extraneous lives, whether they be British royal ones, or a dozen
healthy babies selected at random as suggested by Professor
Leach, 38 property can easily be tied up in trust for well over a
century. Not only has the reform movement failed to address itself
to this issue, but in its efforts to save reasonable dispositions from
the destructive wrath of the Rule, it has succeeded in supplying the
skilled draftsman with yet another gimmick for extending the
perpetuities period, as will be shown later.3A9
B. The Problem of Extraneous Lives
The English Law Reform Committee considered many pro-
posals for eliminating extraneous lives altogether, but, in the end,
abandoned the effort because of the difficulty in fashioning a
definition of measuring lives which would not add new complex-
ities to the common-law Rule. 40 The difficulty in dealing with
extraneous measuring lives under the English statute4 1 is under-
standable. The statutory list of wait-and-see lives42 was carefully
selected so as to include all of the lives ordinarily involved in family
gift transactions. But the wait-and-see lives are to be used only if
the gift violates the common-law Rule. Hence, the precision which
the wait-and-see schedule attempted to achieve might be offset by
37 See text accompanying notes 61-77 infra.
38 In 1938, Leach suggested the use of "nine healthy babies selected at random." Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 642 (1938). By 1952 Leach had increased his
healthy babies to "a dozen or so." LEACH & TUDOR § 24.12. He stayed with the dozen or so in
MORRIS & LEACH 62.
39 See notes 61-77 and accompanying text infra.
40 LAw REFORM COMMITTEE, FOURTH REPORT, CMND. No. 18, at 5 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as FOURTH REPORT].
41 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55.
42 Id. § 3(4)(a).
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destroying the precision inherent in common-law measuring lives.
Professor Maudsley's criticism of the English legislation in failing to
abolish the common-law Rule when enacting wait-and-see is fully
justified in this respect. He would have a schedule of finite,
ascertainable measuring lives which would, for all cases, constitute
the only relevant lives in being.4 3 For such a list to include addi-
tional extraneous lives, the statutory list would have to include a
provision which would permit the transferor to designate any other
persons (not too numerous) as measuring lives. On a policy basis, it
is doubtful that this addition would be made.
In this country, wait-and-see statutes are all variations of the
formula which retains the common-law perpetuities period but
tests validity by "actual rather than possible events. ' '4 4 The consen-
sus of wait-and-see enthusiasts is that the best formula is the one
which restricts measuring lives to those bearing a "causal relation-
ship to vesting. ' '45 Professor Maudsley concurs-yet correctly ob-
serves that the causal relationship formula "is not sufficiently
self-evident to produce ... precision. 46 Professors Philip Br~gy,47
Jesse Dukeminier,48 and Robert Lynn 49 have written extensively
about the application of reform statutes to particular dispositions.
Their analyses and conclusions should prove immeasurably helpful
after we have waited for a century or so to see whether the courts
concur in their interpretations. Maybe a great perpetuities case,
rivaling Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,5° will divide judicial
opinion on "causal relationship" as did Palsgraf on "proximate
cause." As no-fault insurance takes over in the torts arena, per-
petuities litigation might, at last, emerge dominant and, in the
process, effect an equitable distribution of previously pocketed
wealth among members of the probate bar. Although it is pres-
ently inconceivable, there might even be a flood of student peti-
tions demanding a course offering in Future Interests. But alas, no
one will possess sufficient knowledge to teach it, save only a
handful of legal historians who might view the current "reform"
movement as just another chapter in the age-old struggle between
the haves and the have nots-between those who would tie up
43 Maudsley, supra note 30, at 376-78.
44 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950).
45 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (1974).
46 Maudsley, supra note 30, at 375.
41 P. BREGY, INTESTATE WILLS AND ESTATES ACT OF 1947 (1949).
48 J. DUKEMINIER, supra note 17.
19 R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1966).
5o 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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wealth and those who would set it free. And I venture to say, they
will view this "reform" as a significant swing of the pendulum in the
direction of the haves.
But there is no need to argue anew the issue of whether
general wait-and-see statutes do or do not supply certainty in
identifying measuring lives. That debate is a matter of history.51 A
review of the literature generated by the debate should convince
everyone that nothing new can be said. And even if an original
idea were conceived, or a more convincing argument advanced, it
would not convince anyone whose allegiance already is with the
opposition camp. My point is this: If the perpetuities scholars, all
with equally impressive credentials and scholarly achievements, are
in such fundamental disagreement as to identifying measuring
lives under wait-and-see statutes, might not their disagreement
constitute a fairly accurate barometer of divided judicial opinion
when these statutes eventually surface in the courts of construc-
tion? Might they at least agree that their disagreement will persist?
In fact, one of the basic arguments in reply to those who find no
statutory guidance in ascertaining wait-and-see measuring lives is
an expression of confidence in the courts to confine the lives to
those "reasonably related to the gift,"52 and reject those lives that
are so "patently frivolous as to violate the [court's] standard of
dignity . . -53 In other words, wait-and-see advocates clearly
foresee litigation at the end of the road, but have faith in a just and
impartial judiciary "staying the slaughter of the innocents," 54 but
with dignity, intelligence, and above all, sensibility. That confi-
dence-whether warranted or not in the context of determining
lives "causally related to vesting"--is indeed warranted in the
context of excluding extraneous measuring lives.
If the reformers truly see no difficulty in identifying measur-
ing lives under general wait-and-see statutes, why not a general
statutory provision to the effect that "extraneous measuring lives
5I For examples of the affirmative argument, see Dukeminier, supra note 17; Leach,
supra note 6. For examples of the opposing argument, see Mechem, Further Thoughts on the
Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 965 (1959); Simes, Is the Rule Against
Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179 (1953); Sparks, A
Decade of Transition in Future Interests, 45 VA. L. REv. 493 (1959).
52 "[P]hilip Br6gy... has clarified the matter by saying that lives may be used that are
'reasonably related to the gift'-whatever that may mean." Mechem, A Brief Reply to Professor
Leach, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1960).
53 Leach, supra note 6, at 1144; Mechem, supra note 52, at 1156.
54 Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REv. 35 (1952).
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included in any dispositive instrument to extend the perpetuities
period shall be disregarded?" The English Law Reform Committee
was fearful that such a provision might induce the draftsman to
introduce "shadowy beneficial interests to persons who otherwise
would not be beneficiaries at all, merely with the object of bringing
them within the ambit of the definition of permissible lives in
being."' I dare say, the courts would have far less trouble identify-
ing and striking out spurious lives than identifying wait-and-see
lives. There is a vast body of law, not confined to trusts and estates,
which pierces the veil of form to reveal and address itself to the
substance of corporate, commercial, and property transactions. A
court, understandably uncomfortable in the esoteric perpetuities
arena, might feel quite confident in identifying colorable measur-
ing lives. Any draftsman who chooses extraneous lives, whether
they be Leach's dozen or so healthy babies, British royal lives, or
Peter Thellusson's56 issue, knows something about the Rule
Against Perpetuities. He and his client are not likely to be potential
victims of the Rule's hidden traps, which the reformers so worry
about. It is dubious, indeed, that such a draftsman would attempt
to create "shadowy beneficial interests" in order to introduce
otherwise extraneous lives. And if his client is willing to pay the
price, let him buy the lives at full market value. The practice of
lighting extra candles soon would be snuffed out.57
Even Professor Leach (with Mr. Tudor) acknowledged that the
recognition of extraneous measuring lives at common law solely for
the purpose of extending the perpetuities period was "unisti-
fled."158 Yet, neither he nor his followers ever advanced reform
legislation to correct this type of perpetuities imbalance. Mechem
correctly observed: "Not within living memory has the proposal
been made to make the rule more strict."59 Leach's prescription,
which Maudsley readily endorses, 0 for exorcising the "unborn
widow" trap from the Rule's all-possibilities formula, supplies yet
another mode for extending the perpetuities period beyond all
endurable limits.
-5 FOURTH REPORT 8.
56 Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jun. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ch. 1805).
5 "[L]et the lives be never so many, there must be a survivor, and so it is but the length
of that life; (for Twisden used to say, the candles were all lighted at once) ...." Scatterwood
v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1699).
51 LEAcH & TUDOR § 24.16 (Leach & Tudor, The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,
in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.16 (A. Casner ed. 1952)).
o Mechem, supra note 51, at 968.




THE UNBORN WIDOW TRAP: IS THE CURE WORSE
THAN THE DISEASE?
A favorite hypothetical case posed by Professor Leach to
scandalize the unborn widow trap contemplates a bequest by a
father, T, to his 45-year-old son and the son's immediate family.
The son, A, has a wife and three grown children. "T leaves
property in trust 'to pay the income to A for his life, then to pay
the income to A's widow, if any, for her life, then to pay the
principal to the children of A then living.' "61 Invalidity of the gift
of principal to the children is based upon the unlikely possibility of
future progeny being born of a union between a man who, after
death or divorce of his present wife, marries a woman at least 45
years his junior. That the Rule should strike down this perfectly
reasonable disposition indeed is shocking. It is so shocking that the
reformers are unwilling to wait and see& whether the one extremely
remote possibility upon which invalidity 'could be predicated in fact
bcdtirs. This obnoxious trap deserves 'special attention. A general
Wait-and-see statute apparently is not "addquate to the task of
slaying this monster. Leach to the rescue: "The remedy is to
eliminate the 'absolute certainty' requirement and substitute a
requirement of 'reasonable probability'; also to specifically elimi-
nate the Unborn Widow cases by declaring that the spouse of a
life-in-being is automatically deemed to be a life-in-being. '62 Pro-
fessor Maudsley agrees. 63  And so did the legislatures in
California, 64 New Zealand, 65 and Western Australia. 66
61 Leach, supra note 38, at 644; LEACH & TUDOR § 24.21 (Leach & Tudor, The Common
Law Rule Against Perpetuities, in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.21 (A. Casner ed. 1952));
MoRRis & LEACH 72; W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW lNDICTED! 74 (1967) (same example, but
here increased son's age from 45 to 50).
62 Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts and Practitioners Can Do About the Follies of
the Rule, 13 KAN. L. REV. 351, 352 (1965).
n Maudsley, supra note 30, at 358-59.
In determining the validity of a future interest in real or personal property...
an individual described as the spouse of a person in being at the commencement of
a perpetuities period shall be deemed a "life in being" at such time whether or not the
individual so described was then in being.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.7 (West Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
' "The widow or widower of a person who is a life in being for the purpose of the rule
against perpetuities shall be deemed a life in being...." New Zealand Perpetuities Act § 13
(1964).
"6 Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities and Succession) Act 1962 § 12 (W. Austl.). The
language of the Western Australian legislation is identical to that of the New Zealand Act,
supra note 65. Professor Simes speculated that this language would treat the surviving spouse
as a life in being even if it turned out that such person was unborn at the inception of the
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I certainly do not propose to defend the common-law Rule
either in its application to unborn widows or to similarly exagger-
ated cases which Professor Leach identified, labeled, publicized,
and ridiculed as absurdities. Likewise, even opponents of wait-
and-see might find his specific and direct cure for the unborn
widow case particularly appealing. It is free from ambiguity and
applies without exception to all such cases. But remember, the
universal prescription for cure always followed the same hypotheti-
cal case. 67 The disease and the cure had a common creator.
68
We should, therefore, consider the unborn widow in the
context of other possible fact situations. T, at age 68, is widowed
and has three married children, 29, 30, and 33 years of age
respectively. Between them, the children have a total of 9 children
all of whom are under the age of 10. One of the children has a
child en ventre sa mere who is born in due course after T's death. T
dies devising a substantial fund in trust "to pay the net yearly
income per stirpes to such of my lineal descendants, as shall from
time to time be living, until 21 years after the death of the survivor
of all my children and all my grandchildren living at my death or
'born in due time afterwards,' 69 and to continue to pay the net
yearly income as aforesaid until 21 years after the death of the
survivor of all of the spouses, if any, of such children and grand-
children, whether such spouses be alive at my death or born
thereafter, and 21 years after the death of the survivor of all such
children, gandchildren, and spouses of such children and grand-
children, to pay the net yearly income therefrom to such of my
lineal descendants then living for their respective lives, with cross
remainders for life, and upon the death of the survivor of such
lineal descendants, to deliver trust corpus to the State of New
York, in trust, to establish a professorial chair bearing my name
(but this shall not constitute a condition to the gift and is intended
perpetuities period. Simes, Reform of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Western Australia, 6 U.W.
AUSTL. L. REv. 21, 26 (1964).
67 See note 61 supra.
68 The late Professor Joseph H. Beale is described in A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES ON
PROPERTY 82 (2d ed. 1969), as "a master dialectician." "Among his students it was common
talk that you could occasionally beat Beale in an argument, but never if you let him state the
question." Id. 1 have no way of knowing, but strongly suspect Professor Leach authored that
note-and further, that he described a talent and reputation which he admired and rightly
claimed for himself.
69 This was the language over which the litigants argued in the famous (infamous)
Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jun. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ch. 1805). The court found
that the testator did not intend to include after-born issue, but was referring to children en
ventre sa mere at his death.
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as precatory only) in an appropriate College or University in the
State of New York, if such State be then in existence, otherwise to a
political entity most nearly resembling the State of New York,
devoted to the study of the Rule Against Perpetuities and its
contribution, if any, in preventing the prolonged pocketing of
family wealth and in limiting dead-hand control."
Former Dean James K. Logan considered how the Henry Ford
could have tied up his wealth through the use of trusts and special
powers of appointment. Given the facts extant at Henry's death (he
was 83, with four grandchildren, 40, 38, 25, and 23, and several
great-grandchildren all under the age of 6) Logan calculated that
Henry could have tied up his wealth in his family for about 100
years, and, "with luck," postponed the next application of the "tax
wringer" for more than 130 years. 0
There is no need to make a similar calculation for the case
here postulated; a brief reverie should suffice. With a little luck, at
least one of the 10 grandchildren will pattern his matrimonial
life-style in a fashion resembling that of a Charlie Chaplin, a Pierre
Trudeau, or a William 0. Douglas. Vesting in interest might thus
be postponed for 150 years, with the ultimate life estates and cross
remainders for life lasting another 50, 60, or more years. With a
little bit of luck, the trust might last 200 years or more. 1 And what
about the ultimate charitable remainder? By then, the Rule Against
Perpetuities will be completely dead, if it is not so already. But this
should cause no trouble. An appropriate cy-pres solution, such as
the study of ancient legal history, should do.
'0 W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, CASES ON FuTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 734
(1961). Leach acknowledges this to be the work of Logan in W. LEACH, supra note 61, 't 71
n.88. The same acknowledgment is made by the co-authors in their preface. W. LEACH & J.
LOGAN, supra, at xiii.
7 It is believed that all of the interests in this trust would be valid under an "unborn
widow statute" of the California variety set out in note 64 supra. Prior to the expiration of 21
years after the death of the survivor of children and grandchildren living at T's death and
their respective spouses, whenever born, it makes no difference whether some of the
secondary life estates are classified as vested or contingent. All persons who meet the
description of issue of T at the time of any income distribution must meet that description
within the perpetuities period. At the expiration of the specified period, T's lineal descen-
dants, if any be then living, will be ascertained and this class will not be subject to further
increase or decrease beyond the perpetuities period. That the trust might, and probably will,
last long beyond the period is of no moment. Because the number of life income
beneficiaries necessarily is determined within the perpetuities period, the cross remainders
for life among this dass of income beneficiaries vests at the same time. The charitable
remainder to the State of New York vested immediately at T's death. That it probably will
not become possessory until long beyond the perpetuities period is, according to standard
doctrine, irrelevant.
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.IV
EXTRANEOUS LIVES SURVIVED BY UNBORN WIDOWS
Proposals for the elimination of extraneous measuring lives
cannot be accomplished by statute, we are told, because "in the end
they founder on the difficulty of evolving a definition.172 The
dozen or so cases which have bubbled to the surface over the
course of the past 300 years and struck down reasonable disposi-
tions because the draftsmen fell into the unborn widow trap lead
us now to measure by lives not in being. And, of course, we must
wait and see even though a goodly number of perpetuities experts
who are perfectly willing to wait for the interest to vest or fail, do
not now know how long they must wait nor what to look at so as to
see. The Rule Against (I am unable to find a suitable word to
complete the name, although I do know one word that is wholly
inappropriate, i.e., "Perpetuities") can now be stated somewhat as
follows: "No interest is bad until it becomes certain that it will not vest
within 21 years of the death of the widow or widower of any person
[reasonably related to the gift]7 3 living at the creation of the interest;
provided, however, that the number of lives in being and not in being at the
creation of the interest are not so numerous as to make proof of their end
unreasonably difficult to determine." I doubt that this formulation will
give Professor Gray's classic statement of the Rule the slightest
competition, but, I submit, it is literally accurate under some of the
wait-and-see-unborn-widow type statutes,74 and, for all practical
72 FOURTH REPORT 8.
73 See note 52 supra. In my proposed statute, the modifying phrase is enclosed in
brackets because it makes no difference which of the various forms of modifying phrases is
used to identify wait-and-see lives. All of them are equally ambiguous or at least ambiguous
enough to generate litigation. Possibly, the statute might incorporate by reference the
profusion of explanations advanced by Leach, Lynn, Dukeminier, et al. See notes 47-49
supra. Leach modestly advanced the idea that his perpetuities saving clause could be
incorporated by reference in wills and trusts. Leach & Logan, Perpetuities: A Standard Saving
Clause to Avoid Violations of the Rule, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1141 (1961). Why not go all the way
and make his and his reform followers' explanations law?
7' The California statute applies only to those situations where the dispositive provision
makes specific reference to the spouse of a living person. See note 64 supra. The New
Zealand Act does not appear to be so limited:
Unborn husband or wife-The widow or widower of a person who is a life in
being for the purpose of the rule against perpetuities shall be deemed to be a life in
being for the purpose of-
(a) A disposition in favour of that widow or widower; and
(b) A disposition in favour of a charity which attains, or of a person who
attains, or of a class the members of which attain, according to the terms of
the disposition, a vested interest on or after the death of the survivor of the
said person who is a life in being and that widow or widower, or on or after
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purposes, accurate under some of the others. 5
In any event, if the skilled draftsman is unable to tie up
property for at least 150 years, it simply will be a case of bad luck.
He will have selected the wrong royal progenitor or his dozen
babies will prove unhealthy or marry older or fragile spouses.
As the reformers surely must know, the unborn widow trap
can effectively be removed without introducing lives not in being
into the perpetuities formula. There is no insuperable drafting
obstacle. As part of its package of perpetuities reform legislation,
New York law now provides that "[w]here an estate would, except
for this paragraph, be invalid because of the possibility that the
person to whom it is given or limited may be a person not in being
at the time of the creation of the estate, and such person is
referred to in the instrument creating such estate as the spouse of
another without other identification, it shall be presumed that such
reference is to a person in being on the effective date of the
instrument. ' 76 Illinois has a similar statutory provision.77
V
A LIST OF LIVES
By now the reader, no doubt, has anticipated the basic and
fundamental objection to a wait-and-see schedule of measuring
lives, whether that schedule be in substitution for the common-law
Rule as proposed by Professor Maudsley 78 or in addition to the
Rule as enacted under the English statute.7 9 But first, I must
the death of that widow or widower, or on or after the happening of any
contingency during her or his lifetime.
New Zealand Perpetuities Act § 13 (1964). Although the legislative purpose of both the
California and New Zealand Acts probably is the same, i.e., to abolish the unborn widow
trap, the New Zealand Act could be read so as to make the surviving spouse a measuring life
in all dispositions contingent upon survivorship of the named spouse.
n If the intent is to maximize the perpetuities period, the knowledgeable draftsman
who adds extraneous lives obviously will include extraneous spouses.
76 N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1967).
71 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(1)(C) (Supp. 1974). The 1969 "Statute Concerning
Perpetuities" is a comprehensive restructuring of Illinois perpetuities law and is unique in its
thrust to save reasonable dispositions and, at the same time, limit the duration of trusts. For
an excellent article exhaustively reviewing the entire legislative package, see Schuyler, The
Statute Concerning Perpetuities, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 3 (1970). For another sensible proposal to
reform the Rule by limiting trust duration in tbe process of excising the traps, see Schuyler,
Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REv. 683 (Pt. I), 887 (Pt. II)
(1958).
78 See Maudsley, supra note 30, at 370-73, 375, 378, 379.
79 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, § 1.
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express my complete agreement with Professor Maudsley in his
criticism of the English Act for failing to abolish the common-law
Rule when enacting wait-and-see.
Whether the Act is formidably complex, as its critics claim,80 or
is simply a long and complex piece of legislation by any standard, it
is abundantly successful in combining the worst features of both
the common-law Rule and wait-and-see. That is, if one believes that
there is a need to retain the word "against" in the perpetuities rule.
It has something for everyone who wants to tie up wealth for
an extended period of time. The lazy estate planner who finds
making lists boring, and maintaining them a time-consuming nui-
sance, can settle for an 80-year period in gross.8' But those estate
planners who are accustomed to using royal lives clauses but fear
that the last batch of royal progenitors produced descendants who
appear to be poor candidates for longevity, and prefer not to
search the maternity wards of the Cambridge-Boston hospitals for
a dozen or so healthy babies, can fall back on all of those statutory
lives as a viable alternative for maximizing the perpetuities period.
I think we have come to believe that people and candles are
truly the same. So long as there is no inconvenience in keeping
track of them, we care not how many there be.8 2 Back in the days
of Twisden,8 3 I will bet most candles did burn out at the same
rate-and maybe most people did too. But even in the days of
shorter life expectancies, it took no quickness of mind to figure out
that the more lives there were, the greater were the chances of the
longest liver of the expanded group living longer than if the initial
group was restricted in number. And further, the rich have a
better chance of living longer than the poor (no citation needed).
That fact of life (and death) abideth forever.
What basically is wrong with a statutory list of wait-and-see
lives is the impossibility of constructing one which sufficiently
80 Morris & Wade, supra note 31, at 501.
8' Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, § 1.
82 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, § 3(4)(a) provides as follows:
[W]here any persons falling within subsection (5) below [which gives the schedule of
wait-and-see lives] are individuals in heing and ascertainable at the commencement
of the perpetuity period the duration of the period shall be determined by
reference to their lives and no others, but so that the lives, of any description of
persons falling within paragraph (b) or (c) of that subsection shall be disregarded
if the number of persons of that description is such as to render it impracticable to
ascertain the date of death of the survivor.
Thus the drafters recognized that the wait-and-see lives might expand the number of
measuring lives dramatically. Their only concern, however, was one of convenience in
determining when the last of the candles goes out.
83 See note 57 supra.
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restricts the number of lives and, at the same time, permits
sufficient flexibility to enable those-who so desire to create varying
schemes of reasonable wealth transmission. Even wait-and-see en-
thusiasts recognize these shortcomings. Thus, Dr. Morris and Pro-
fessor Wade criticized the English statute for casting "its net so
widely in order to cover every conceivable case that many quite
inappropriate lives are included" resulting in an extension of "the
'wait and see' period beyond what anyone contemplated and
beyond what wise policy would seem to dictate."' 4
My criticism of Professor Maudsley's thesis is the same criti-
cism which can be leveled at every variety of wait-and-see statute.
The underlying theory is unsound. In the end, all of them tend to
extend the perpetuities period. Maudsley argues again and again
that "since a disposition which must vest, if it ever does, within the
period, will vest, if it ever does, within the period, every case can be
determined on the basis of wait and see."8 We had to wait and see
whether valid gifts vested or failed to vest at common law. So now
we wait and see, continues Maudsley's argument, just as we did at
common law, except gifts void at common law are treated for the
time being as valid, and we wait and see whether they vest, in fact,
within the period.8 6 This form of argument is intended to lead one
to believe that the difference between wait-and-see and the
common-law Rule is the difference between tweedledum and
tweedledee. Not so! The statutory list of measuring lives enacts into
law extraneous measuring lives and makes them a part of each
dispositive instrument. Extraneous measuring lives are drafted into
instruments only by those who intend thereby to maximize dead-
hand control. To select the outer limits of an already too long
perpetuities period as the standard measure makes about as much
sense as fixing automobile speed limits at just one mile per hour
under that speed which statistically is determined to be involved in
the greatest percentage of fatal automobile accidents.
There are several other basic problems that I have with Pro-
fessor Maudsley's formulation-or, should I say, his defense of the
basic approach of the English perpetuities legislation. His thesis is
that if we are to have wait-and-see, it is essential that we get it right;
that the measuring lives be appropriate to the new rule of wait-
and-see. He states:
[C]ommon-law lives will not do, even if it were possible to de-
84 Morris & Wade, supra note 31, at 502.
85 Maudsley, supra note 30, at 379. See id. at 365, 371, 378.
86 Id. at 364-66.
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lineate a category of common-law lives, including some who did
not validate the gift. There is no assurance that they will be the
right lives for wait-and-see. Wait-and-see is a new concept in the
law of perpetuities. There is no reason to suppose that common-
law lives would be appropriate to this new era. One needs to take
a fresh look at the whole situation and ask: Who ought to be a
measuring life under wait-and-see?8 7
But how do you determine "who ought to be a measuring life
under wait-and-see?" Maudsley's answer is that it is "a policy
decision."88
I think Maudsley's article gives us some insight into his present
conception of the nature of that policy question. He states:
The list [under the English statute] includes a number of persons
connected in one way or another with the disposition. The
question to ask, when considering a candidate for inclusion is: if
the interest vests within 21 years of that person's death, would I
wish to uphold the gift? It is important to get this question right,
and to get away from outdated concepts of including only lives
who were "relevant" in the context of the common-law Rule.8 9
He also observes: "There is no a priori qualification for inclusion
since the selection of the statutory lives is a matter of policy." 90 But
if we test the appropriateness for inclusion of a life in our list by
answering the question, "would I wish to uphold the gift" if it vests
within 21 years of that person's death, have we not, thereby, also
answered the policy question? I am inclined to believe that we
have; and have done so in a way which simply avoids any seiious
consideration of perpetuities policy.
There is one more basic disagreement that I have with Profes-
sor Maudsley's formulation. Toward the end of his article he
suggests that the English list does include all of the common-law
lives except two categories of lives. 91 I agree with his earlier and
more cautious observation that "common-law lives will not do,
87 Id. it 375.
88 Id.
Professor Maudsley and I have corresponded on the subject of measuring lives at some
length. He has agreed that many of the matters which troubled me have proved troublesome
under the English statutory list, that "a mass of points have arisen on the English list-which
no one seems to have noticed." Letter from Professor Maudsley to the author, September
17, 1974 (on file at the Cornell Law Review). Professor Maudsley acknowledged the complex-
ity of these matters, but considered a detailed discussion of the English legislation beyond
the scope of bis present article. Id.
" Maudsley, supra note 30, at 377.
90 Id.
11 Id. at 377-78.
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even if it were possible to delineate a category of common-law lives .... '
Although most of the perpetuities fact patterns have recurred with
great frequency, I think it is impossible to delineate all of the
common-law lives. And furthermore, I think any attempt at such a
definition introduces more complexity into this area of the law
than already exists.
Again, the genesis for the thesis that reform is essential be-
cause a basic understanding of the perpetuities formula is too
complex for the average practitioner is traceable to Professor
Leach. This theme Leach struck in his first attack on the Rule in a
1952 law review article with such statements as it "is so abstruse
that it is misunderstood by a substantial percentage of those who
advise the public. '93 To prove beyond cavil that it is beyond the
reach of all but a handful of perpetuities scholars, Leach suggested
that even he had difficulty with the Rule. In his foreword to
Dukeminier's Perpetuities Law in Action, Leach said of the work: "As
an argument for perpetuities reform, it is overwhelming, though I
confess to some predisposition to being overwhelmed on this
subject. '94
Professor Maudsley echoes this same discouraging thesis,95 the
design of which is not only to reduce perpetuities to a level of
understanding for the unsophisticated estate planner, but to
guarantee that even the para-legal or clerk-typist shall not fall
victim to its complexities. The Rule Against Perpetuities is not
difficult because of the thought process which must be employed to
solve perpetuities problems. It is difficult because it is part of a
difficult and complex body of law known as future interests. The
difficulties are generated by the degree of flexibility which this
branch of the law permits in property transmission. But that is the
genius of this branch of the law. It permits one whose life's work
has generated a substantial quantum of wealth to devise a scheme
of disposition for future generations that is appropriate to his
particular situation and desires-so long as he keeps it within due
limits, that is, within the confines of the perpetuities period. If
simplicity is the end object of reform, simply abolish the law of
future interests. Require that outright gifts be given. That will take
care of the whole mess., Another way of solving the problem is
simply to tax the fortune out of existence at the testator's death.
912 Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
13 Leach, supra note 26, at 722.
94 Leach, Foreword to J. DUKEMINIER, PERPETUITIES LAW IN Ac'oN, at v (1962).
95 Maudsley, supra note 30, at 361, 364, 376, 379.
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Provide that property left at death which exceeds X dollars in value
shall become the property of the United States and the state of the
decedent's domicile. Why mess around with perpetuities reform
legislation which requires volumes of esoteric writing to explain?




Let us return to the policy debate. Unfortunately, major policy
questions occupied a relatively minor position in the proliferation
of writing generated by the "reform" movement. The major debate
was devoted to details, which, of course, were related sub silentio to
questions of policy. But with the passage of time, the debate, with
its understandable attention to practical detail, tended to divert
attention from fundamental policy matters to the more immediate
issues which the variety of new proposals presented. Professor
Bertel M. Sparks' observations regarding the nature of the reform
debate are even more appropriate today than when he made them
over fifteen years ago:
[F]ar too much of the re-examination of the Rule Against Per-
petuities has been concerned with technical details relating to the
Rule's application and too little with questions of basic policy....
Too often attention has been drawn to tle way in which the rule
frustrates the intent of testators and grantors. This approach has
tended to conceal the fact that the very purpose of the Rule is to
prevent the effectiveness of certain kinds of intent believed to be
anti-social. The frustration-of-intent theme is easy to popularize
and has encouraged some legislative enthusiasts to enact statutes
tending to enlarge the permitted tying up of property without
first inquiring into whether or not this is the policy goal being
sought. 6
One further observation can be made regarding the nature of
the reform debate as it related to policy considerations. Most
arguments advanced by the reformers minimized the contempo-
rary importance of the Rule's social and public utility. Furthermore,
questions were raised as to whether the wealthy desired to exercise
prolonged dead-hand control, and, if so, whether our income,
estate, and gift tax laws prevented the amassing of vast concentra-
tions of wealth and further prevented diminished concentrations
of wealth from being perpetuated in one's family.




"Is there any tendency among the wealthy," queried Professor
Leach in 1960, "to produce trusts which exceed the period of
perpetuities?" 97 His answer: "In thirty-five years of practice, largely
connected with estate work, I have never found a testator or settlor
who had any wish to exceed the limits of the Rule in its most severe
application. Is this atypical?" 98 Great balls of fire!!99 The great
estate planner, the twentieth-century Orlando Bridgman, 00 never
had a client who wanted to create a trust which would last more
than 21 years! Have 1 misread both the question and the answer?
The question asks whether there is any desire to produce "trusts
which exceed the period of perpetuities," not whether there is a desire to
have interests in trust remain contingent or to vest beyond the
period. And the answer to this trust duration question is that there is
no "wish to exceed the limits of the Rule in its most severe applica-
tion." The most severe application of the Rule of which I am aware
is where there are no measuring lives available to validate the
interest and the perpetuities period thus is reduced to no more
than a 21-year period in gross.
If I have not misread Leach's question and answer, certainly I
have misunderstood his general intent. But, from what he said, I
must confess my inability to determine his meaning and must,
therefore, look elsewhere. In the same law review article in which
he supplied us with this remarkable information about his estate
practice, Leach further declared
that the long trust question is not at issue in discussion of these
[wait-and-see] statutes. The reason is this (and I have said it time
and again and it has never been answered): in all cases that have
arisen in this century where the gift has failed under the Rule, the
9- Leach, supra note 6, at 1140.
98 Id.
99 Although Professor E. F. Roberts did not originate this exclamation of incredulity, he
is recognized here because this was his reaction to several assertions made by Professor
Leach in his review of W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDIcTED! (1967). See Roberts, Book Review,
53 CORNELL L. REv. 163, 164 (1967).
100 It is dear from the published precedents in conveyancing of this period [the late
seventeenth century] that the final evolution of that scheme [the strict settlement]
was due largely to Bridgman himself, who, as we have seen, was both the first
conveyancer of his day, and an important contributor to the settlement of the
modern rule against perpetuities. It is in fact his creation of the modern strict
settlement which constitutes his chief claim to be called the "father of modem
conveyancing."
7 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 376-77 (1926).
Bridgman's scheme could, for all practical purposes, tie up land in fee tail in perpetuity,
despite the availability of the common recovery. For a description of this scheme, see A.
CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 68, at 357-58.
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instrument could have been so drafted as to be unchallengeable under the
strictest perpetuities doctrine unaided by legislation.'0'
I think the reason that no answer has ever been supplied for this
non-question is because very few perpetuities scholars would be
interested in writing a two-word law review article. The only
appropriate response to that profound assertion of fact is: "So
what?" Nor are the reporters filled with cases involved with pros-
ecutions for non-criminal conduct, actions against non-tort-feasors,
suits against debtors who have faithfully performed their obliga-
tions and antitrust suits against the operators of neighborhood
family grocery stores. That the reported perpetuities cases might
all involve lawyer errors in unsuccessfully attempting to accomplish
reasonable dispositions for their clients proves absolutely nothing
about that vast number of wills and trusts prepared in Wall Street
law offices by expert trust and estate practitioners. Let me pose a
question for Leach's wait-and-see followers: Why did the English Law
Reform Committee recommend,10 2 and the English Parliament enact,103
an alternative 80-year period in gross to lure English practitioners away
from the practice of using "royal lives" clauses?10 4
Professor Leach criticized the Restatement of Property for ar-
ticulating a rationale for the Rule Against Perpetuities on economic
and social grounds because its Reporter and bis advisors were "all
lawyers, no economists or sociologists.' 0 5 He then tried to per-
suade us, on the basis of empirical research (35 years of his estate
practice) and reported perpetuities cases generated by incompetent
attorneys, tbat the nature of man has changed-no longer does the
dynastic instinct exist; no longer does man seek to capture immor-
tality by projecting his will into the future. Would it be impertinent
to suggest that the opinions of anthropologists, psychiatrists,
psychologists, and historians be solicited before we accept the
conclusions and recommendations of yet another lawyer?
B. Taxes and the Rule
It is to his great credit that Professor Simes never faltered in
his resistance to wait-and-see. 0 6 Had he capitulated, the Rule
101 Leach, supra note 6, at 1134.
102 FOURTH REPORT 9.
103 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, § 1.
104 "It is necessary to specify a substantial period such as 80 years in order to attract
draftsmen away from 'royal lives' clauses . FOURTH REPORT 9.
10' See note 6 supra.
108 L. SIMES, LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK ON PERPETUITIES 36 (1958); L. SIMES, supra note




Against Perpetuities would not be "doomed"' 07-- it would be dead.
As with many another prescription for curing the ills of society,
those who resist change must suffer the brickbats of the
reformerst0 8 even though they do not resist reform, per se, but
merely the particular prescription of the then reformers.10 9 The
small anti-reform camp needed a giant, the likes of a Simes, lest it
be overwhelmed by sheer numbers, so large did Leach's followers
grow as he led them to the promised land of wait-and-see.
But Simes made one critical mistake along the way. He agreed
with Leach that "the 'threat to the public welfare from family
dynasties built either on great landed estates or on great capital
wealth' ... is rather effectively removed by our income and estate
taxes."110 Simes pressed this theme even further, asserting "that
undue concentration of wealth is an evil which can best be combat-
ted by tax legislation, rather than by perpetuity rules." ' 1
If taxes do, or should be made to, break up large concentra-
tions of wealth, there is no need for a Rule Against Perpetuities. I
believe not for one moment that our tax laws ever so operated;
and, further, do not believe it wise policy to restructure them to
accomplish that end. Trusts and future interests are, or only
should be, used to perpetuate family wealth where the wealth
involved is substantial. If income taxes prevent the accumulation of
substantial estates, there will be no need to provide for future
generations-outright gifts and bequests will be the only sensible
alternative. Likewise, if income tax laws are not confiscatory and
allow for substantial accumulations of wealth during life, the use of
trusts and future interests at death will become obsolete if estate
taxes are, or become, confiscatory. On the other hand, the Rule
Against Perpetuities, I think, presupposes a competitive, capitalistic
society (not a welfare state)11 2 which recognizes man's desire to
perpetuate his wealth beyond his death, but circumscribes that
desire and confines it within due limits. It is designed to strike a
balance between the desire of one whom society encourages to be
productive and thus reap his just rewards, including a limited
107 Simes, supra note 51.
108 In Leach, supra note 6, although Professor Leach stated in the first portion of his
article that he was responding to the writings of Professors Bordwell, Mechem, Simes, and
Sparks, it should be apparent to everyone that his main attack was directed at Simes.
109 Professor Simes favored both cy-pres reformation as a substitute for total invalidity
under the common-law Rule and also favored what Professor Maudsley, in Maudsley, supra
note 30, at 358-60, describes as "patching up." See, e.g., Simes, supra note 66, at 25.
110 L. SIMES, supra note 2, at 56-57. See note 6 supra.
1 Id. at 57.
11 Contra, id. at 57-58; Leach, supra note 6, at 1137.
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degree of dead-hand control, and society's desire to loosen the grip
of that dead hand so as to allow once again exposure of that wealth
to the rough-and-tumble of the competitive marketplace. In other
words, one may postpone, for a limited time, exposure of his
wealth to the operation of the natural phenomenon of "shirt
sleeves to shirt sleeves in three generations."
But Professor Leach, who was an expert both in the law of
future interests and taxation, assured us that the public weal was
protected by our tax laws in regard to undue wealth concentration.
I think it might be useful to set out, in consecutive order, each of
his statements which related to perpetuities and taxation:
1952: Graduated estate and income taxes have largely elimi-
nated any threat to the public welfare from family dynasties
built either on great landed estates or on great capital wealth.
If there were at this present date no Rule against Perpetuities
it seems unlikely that there would be a clamor for such a rule
either in the legislatures or in the courts. It does no harm to
continue the Rule as a restraint on the whims of an occasional
refugee from the nineteenth century, but we should make sure
that it is limited to that cautionary function and does not
disrupt the prudent dispositions of reasonable men. 113 [No
footnotes follow any sentence in this paragraph.]
1960: Still and all, I think Wisconsin should have a restriction
on future interests.., for a very practical reason: our present
estate and inheritance tax system depends upon the wealth of
the community going through the wringer every so often, and
in the main it depends upon the Rule Against Perpetuities and
its relatives to prevent the intervals from being too long. If
Wisconsin stays out of line in this matter, and if some tax-
113 Leach, supra note 26, at 727.
There is particular poignancy to any statement of fact by Leach which is unsupported
by a footnote, as is true in the quoted passage. When a person who gained a reputation as a
master of the footnote cites no authority nor has anything to say about the assertion by way
of footnote elaboration, the silence becomes almost deafening. Leach's footnote reputation
was well deserved. Witness the evaluations of others in this regard: "Those who are familiar
with the Leach writings realize that he has raised the humble footnote to an art form in legal
literature. Connoisseurs of Leachiana frequently run through the footnotes before bother-
ing with the text." Logan, Foreword to W. LEACH, supra note 61.
Professor Leach indisputably is second to none in the effective use of footnotes-his
are read; and often more carefully than his text. Depending upon which side of the
issue one finds himself, and whether he is on the giving or receiving end of the
Leachian barb, the notes to this article [Leach, supra note 6] reach a "high" point in
this art form.
S. FETTERS & J. SMITH, SIMES' CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 794 n.60 (3d ed. 1971). So that
there may be no need to speculate, I was the author of the latter compliment.
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payers or evenjust a couple of big ones, abuse the privilege for
a supposed tax advantage, the Internal Revenue Code will be
amended to eliminate the abuse, and the amendment may well
do harm outside, as well as inside, Wisconsin. Special provi-
sions of the Code were enacted to eliminate tax advantages in
the Delaware statute, and these have been a nuisance to
everyone. 1 4 [Only the last sentence is footnoted--to the Internal
Revenue Code and A. Casner, Estate Planning (2d ed. 1956). ]
1961: It is sometimes said that the Rule prevents an undue
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. This may have
been true in past times, but the existence of graduated income
tax, surtax, and death duties renders the Rule (if this is its sole
object) quite unnecessary today. 115 [No footnotes follow this
paragraph.]
1965: There has been considerable scholarly debate as to the
social and economic justification for the Rule, summarized in
current literature." 6 [The footnote to that sentence: "See Leach &
Logan... in which Dean Logan and I have quoted most of the
experts who hold views opposing our own. At 108 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1124, 1133-42 (1960), I have attempted to answer those
opposing views.""11 7 That fairly well republishes Leach's perpetuities
tax statements of 1960.]
1967: From what I have said heretofore you might gather
that I would like to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities. If I
have created this impression I apologize for being ambiguous.
I think it desirable that some limitation be put upon men and
women who, in their folly, want to tie up their wealth
indefinitely. Among other things, the estate tax laws are based
upon the assumption that the wealth of the country shall go
through the tax wringer every so often, and this is as it should
be. There is one state of the Union where, for all practical
purposes, there is no Rule against Perpetuities or anything like
it. This is Wisconsin, and Delaware is not far behind .... I
don't like this and, although no "visible inconvenience" (I am
quoting Nottingham) has yet occurred, it is of the essence of
human nature that some unwise person of wealth, unwisely
advised, sometimes will do something very foolish. In South
Africa there is no Rule against Perpetuities or equivalent and
114 Leach, supra note 6, at 1141-42.
"5 MORRIS & LEACH 15.
116 Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REv. 973, 977 (1965).
117 Id. at n.25.
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there are instances in which South African real estate has been
(successfully) tied up for over a hundred generations [sic!].
Something will inevitably be done about this in that unhappy
land, and it may well be worse than anything we have now. 1 8
[There are no citations to the tax wringer, but in the same book Leach
states: "As a practical matter this permits a skilled lawyer to
control a testator's property for about a century after the
testator's death and also to keep this property immune from
estate taxes as presently applied by the Internal Revenue Code
and various state statutes." 1 9 To this last sentence, there is a
footnote 20 which refers the reader to Cases on Future Interests
where Logan goes through the academic exercise of showing how to
prevent the tax wringer from being applied for over 130 years. 2'
Also, the reader, no doubt, has detected that at least in South Africa,
the nature of man has not changed, and, unlike Leach's clients, there
is a tendency to want to tie up property therefor more than 21 years.]
I shall not insult the reader by subjecting him to a detailed
analysis of these spurious, self-serving, and contradictory state-
ments. That Professor Maudsley has deemed it appropriate to
associate himself with Leach's statements regarding U.S. tax policy,
I am sorry.' 22 Had Professor Leach lived to witness the tax revela-
118 W. LEACH, supra note 61, at 75-76.
119 Id. at 70-71.
120 Id. at n.88.
121 W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 70. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
122 See Maudsley, supra note 30, at 362-63.
1 know far less about tax law and policy than I do about perpetuities law and policy.
Nonetheless, I feel free to indulge in assertions of fact and opinions in regard to the former
supported by an equally abundant quantum of authority as both Leach and Simes:
United States tax laws favor big business and the wealthy. Graduated income taxes tax most
severely the wage earner, rather than the taxpayer whose income is derived primarily from
invested capital. The estate tax wringer can be avoided for over a century after its first
application (here I cite LEACH & LOGAN) and the first application can be substantially
reduced by the marital deduction which became law between the time Leach first made his
statements concerning perpetuities vs. taxes and his more recent statements. Also, the tax
loopholes have proliferated rather than been plugged, and these loopholes are available
primarily to the wealthy, not the middle income wage earner.
Although the following text with its accompanying statistics is not derived from a
scholarly journal, the reader might, nonetheless, find it of some interest and relevancy to
the issue of whether our system of graduated income taxes (combined with an "estate tax
wringer" applied every one to two hundred years) effectively prevents undue concentrations
of wealth and, hence, renders the Rule Against Perpetuities obsolete in this regard:
On January 17, 1969, just three days before the Johnson Administration left office,
outgoing Treasury Secretary Joseph Barr attracted nationwide attention when he
told Congress that in 1967, 155 Americans with incomes of $200,000 or more had
paid not a penny of Federal income taxes. Twenty-three of those fortunate
individuals had contrived to enjoy incomes of a million dollars or more, without
paying any tax whatever.
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tions of the "post-Watergate era," I doubt that he would have been
at all shocked to learn that persons with annual incomes in excess
of one to six million dollars sometimes pay no federal income tax
and that the grandchildren of one of the great Robber Barons still
retain wealth valued in excess of 1.3 billion dollars at a time when
their holdings have suffered severe paper losses due to depressed
stock market conditions. 123 Would Professor Leach be shocked to
learn that most of that family's wealth still is tied up in trust-and
that the trusts were created in New York when that State labored
under its overly restrictive, and much maligned, two lives rule
against suspension of trust duration? 1 doubt it.12 4
CONCLUSION
Jurisdictions that have adopted wait-and-see should abolish it.
That might be difficult politically. But where it has not yet become
law, but is being considered by the legislature, it should not be
voted out of committee. The first case to reach the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania involving that Commonwealth's unfortunate wait-
and-see legislation, which Professor Maudsley criticised as an ex-
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the taxlessness among the very rich of which Barr
spoke was a rapidly growing phenomenon. Here, once again, are the figures:
Number in Group Who Paid No Tax in
Income* Group 1960 1967 1969
Above $1,000,000 11 23 56
Above $500,000 23 63 117
Above $200,000 70 167 301
Above $100,000 104 399 761
* These figures understate the extent of tax avoidance among the very rich. For one thing,
"income," as used here, means "adjusted gross income" (AGI), which is computed after a person
deducts from his total income his business deductions, including "paper" deductions in the case
of real-estate investors (see p. 175). Thus AGI can be vastly less than a person's real income.
(One wealthy real-estate investor had total income of $1,433,000-but an "adjusted gross
income" of zero!)
For another, the figures in the above table deal only with those wealthy people who
achieved total taxlessness. They omit the "near misses"-affluent persons who paid a pittance in
taxes (e.g., an actual taxpayer cited in a Treasury Department study who had total income of
$1,284,000 and paid just $274 in taxes).
In revealing these figures, Barr talked of "the possibility of a taxpayer
revolt"-and not without reason. As Barr observed, "millions of middle class
families and individuals" were paying taxes "based on the full ordinary [tax] rates."
But even more striking, the same tax law that was levying no tax on hundreds of
millionaires was, at the same time, extracting some taxes from 2,200,000 Americans
who were living below the officially designated "poverty" level.
P. STERN, THE RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER 67 (2d ed. 1973).
12' See, e.g., Wall St. Jour., Sept. 24, 1974, at 34, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1974, § 3,
at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1974, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1974, § 3, at 1, col.
3; TIME, Sept. 2, 1974, at 14-23.
124 It is stated in W. LEACH, supra note 61, at 80-81, however, that the overly restrictive
New York Perpetuities Law caused men of wealth to establish inter vivos trusts outside of
New York, causing a "flight of capital" from the Empire State.
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ample of how not to wait and see, should not go unnoticed as an
example of the defective nature of wait-and-see in any form. 25
First, the testator (albeit without the aid of competent or incompe-
tent counsel) attempted to create a trust to pay income to his
collateral kindred and their issue ad infinitum, in perpetuity, with
the remainder to go to certain designated charities. Second, the
first round of litigation was prosecuted to the State's highest court.
Third, the court refused to make a determination as to whether
the ultimate gift to charity was vested or contingent, or, in other
words, whether it was valid in its creation. Such a determination,
declared the court, would violate the spirit of the wait-and-see
statute.' 26 Fourth, although the parties in interest must wait and
see in reference to the validity or invalidity of their respective
interests, they need not wait and see whether further time consum-
ing and money consuming litigation will occur somewhere down
the road. They know that right now-and know it will occur to a
moral certainty. 2 7
Would a schedule of lives as proposed by Professor Maudsley
work any better? I doubt it. If the Pennsylvania court's judicial
attitude is typical, and is so permeated with wait-and-see that it
refuses even to classify an interest as valid irrespective of future
events, what help is there in knowing, for the time being, which
lives will measure the period of uncertainty? I guess the answer is,
we will know when to litigate. Without a list, we must first litigate to
determine when next to litigate. Well, there is something to say.for
the list. But I doubt that it says enough to warrant salvaging an
otherwise worthless rule-that is, the Rule of Wait-And-See, not
that rule known as the Rule Against Perpetuities.
25 In re Estate of Pearson, 442 Pa. 172, 275 A.2d 336 (1971). See Maudsley,supra note
30, at 367-69.
126 The court below, in derogation of both Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 Ad. 85
(1938), and the "wait and see" statute, proceeded to a determination of the legality
of all the future interests upon testator's death. The lower court's rationale was the
necessity to pass on the eligibility of the charities to take under the will since the
extent of their taking will affect the tax liability of the estate. It may be true that
cases such as Carter Estate [citation omitted] exemplify this Court's recognition of the
necessity, occasioned by the federal estate and state inheritance tax laws, for a
prompt determination of questions concerning future interests; however, owing to
the ever-increasing extent of estate tax liability, to recognize this principle in this
context would emasculate the "wait and see" rule. We cannot adopt the rationale of
the court below . . . .The remainder over to charity may or may not be valid
depending upon (1) whether the interest is contingent; and (2) even if contingent
whether any of the preceding interests run afoul of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
In accordance with both Quigley's Estate and the "wait and see" rule, we will not now
determine the validity of the interest to charity.
Id. at 287-88, 275 A.2d at 342-43.
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